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A B S T R A C T
A strong online response has marked contention on shale gas from the outset, as campaign members link across
borders to share information and inform themselves about the impacts of development. In this article, we apply a
post-political lens to online activity in the English shale gas debate, to determine how this complex information
ecology has shaped the dynamics of protest. Using shale gas development in Lancashire, North West England, as
our case study we argue that the seismic events of 2011, in combination with the Government framing of public
scepticism as a matter of information deficit led to an online information divide which constrained how effec-
tively the dominant institutional actors could engage. Between 2011 and 2017, three challenges of online in-
formation: complexity, overload and loss of gatekeepers, served to perpetuate this division. Anti-shale gas
campaigners were less constrained in their activity but the substantial burden of online activism contributed
towards perceptions of disempowerment, as improved information access failed to deliver policy influence. The
ultimate consequence was to contribute towards the turn to direct action. Applying a post-political analysis to
online activity in information-intensive issues yields valuable insights into the varied ways in which internet use
may influence the expression of dissent.
1. Introduction
Online contention has been a characteristic of debate over shale gas
since almost the outset, and controversial [1] footage of flaming tap
water from the documentary Gasland [2] has been credited with pre-
cipitating the opposition movement [3]. Yet while moratoria have been
imposed in parts of Europe, North America and Australia, the Govern-
ment in England has been slower to respond to public concerns. Post-
political theory provides a lens through which to analyse the processes
by which dissent is excluded from the political arena [4] and online
activism has been mooted as one channel through which it may return
[5,6]. Undoubtedly, the internet has changed the ways in which protest
movements operate and the context within which they operate, re-
quiring them to navigate an information environment which is in-
creasingly complex [7]. This complexity however, must also be nego-
tiated by those in power and cannot be assumed to work to their benefit
[8]. In this paper, we explore these dynamics in more depth, con-
sidering their role in the development of contestation over shale gas in
England, using the Fylde, Lancashire, as our case study.
We situate our work at the intersection of political geography, en-
ergy geography and digital politics, applying concepts from all three
fields to address the following questions. Firstly, to establish how dif-
ferent stakeholder groups used online information to engage in the
shale gas debate and to determine what they believed the effects of
their own and others’ activity to be. Secondly, to identify the challenges
of engaging online with an information-intensive issue and how this
affected the different groups’ activities. Finally, to consider the con-
sequences of online information use for political contestation of an
information-intensive issue. Did this activity indeed provide a channel
for dissenting voices to be heard or did it have other effects?
Our work reveals how this complex information environment
helped shape the dynamics of a protest marked by unprecedented levels
of public opposition and billboards urging passing motorists to “Google
Fracking.” Drawing from 37 stakeholder interviews, we show how the
hydraulic fracturing (fracking) induced seismic events of 2011 led to a
phenomenon which we term an online information divide, whereby anti-
shale gas campaigners were highly active online while industry and
government officials were constrained in their activity. Once underway,
familiar challenges of the online information environment: complexity,
overload and loss of gatekeepers, perpetuated this division. While the
long-term effects remain unknown, our analysis suggests that in the
short term their primary effect was to cause industry and government to
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retreat from online engagement, perpetuate deadlock and, ultimately,
fuel a turn to direct action. Shale gas's continued unpopularity un-
doubtedly contributed to the UK government's recent decision to im-
pose a second moratorium on fracking [9] but a post-political reading
suggests the move is driven by pragmatic considerations rather than
ideological ones, leaving the way open for the industry's return.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.1, we set out post-
political theory as it pertains to the exclusion of dissent, and show how
it applies in the case of shale gas. In Section 2.2, we discuss the char-
acteristics of shale gas development which have caused debates about
information to come to the fore. In Section 2.3, we introduce the lit-
erature on digital politics and online information before summarising
the current research on the role of the internet in mobilising opposition
to shale gas. Having established the gaps which we seek to address, in
Section 3, we introduce our case study and data; in Section 4, we pre-
sent our results and discussion; and in Section 5, we conclude with
limitations and suggestions for further research.
2. Literature review
2.1. Post-political theory
Post-political theory provides a framework by which to consider
how dissenting opinions are systematically excluded from mainstream
political debate. The concept emerged in the post-Cold War era from
the work of a group of philosophers including Mouffe [10], Rancière
[11], and Žižek [12]. Uniting their work is a critique of the politics of
consensus dominant in the then-current modes of political administra-
tion. This focus on generating consensus, they argued, obscured broader
discussions about desired societal futures and reduced government to
narrow debates over matters of techno-managerial administration, op-
erating within an uncontested framework of neoliberal economics and
under the auspices of a liberal democracy which in practice delivered
power to the political elite. Questioning this framework was frequently
futile, leading to sceptics being labelled as either backwards-looking
traditionalists or dangerous fundamentalists, whose complaints de-
served to be sidelined [10]. This exclusion of dissenting views, how-
ever, could never be assumed to be a permanent state of affairs. Ac-
cording to post-political theory, politics is inherently antagonistic: “the
field upon which we deal with fundamental antagonisms, where we
determine the basic economic and social coordinates of our shared fu-
ture,” ([6] p. 8). The upshot of attempting to exclude dissent from
mainstream political debate is “not less politics but rather more politics–
albeit by other means than those commonly and traditionally re-
cognized as legitimately political,” ([5] p. 191, emphasis in original).
This broad theoretical underpinning has been elaborated upon by
political geographer Erik Swyngedouw who, across a series of works
[4,13,14], theorises the processes by which dissent is excluded from
debate on environmental matters. Of particular interest to our analysis
is his argument that dissenting voices are marginalised through systems
of governance which mobilise expert knowledge and methods of risk
calculation to reinforce growth-led ideologies. Once the debate has
been so framed the only remaining issue upon which the public can
engage is how to deliver the agreed solution most efficiently. Post-
politics in action therefore elides that contentious issues are contested
by actors with uneven power and endeavours to frame fundamental
political disputes as primarily matters of problem solving, operating
within a broader uncontested framework [15]. This insight has been
applied to a number of contentious issues, particularly locally un-
wanted development projects, giving rise to a body of work providing a
post-political analysis of public participation in infrastructure planning
[5,16–18] which documents how these processes systematically act to
limit the type and scope of arguments which are heard, to the benefit of
pro-development stakeholders. Research on shale gas suggests similar
dynamics in operation, with broader questions over the societal desir-
ability of developing a new fossil fuel, and the distributive injustices of
shale gas development, expressly excluded from official deliberations
[19,20]. As a result, the issue has become increasingly contentious as
anti-shale gas campaigners resort to alternative methods of expressing
their opposition, ranging from judicial review to direct action.
2.2. Shale gas as an information-intensive conflict
Contention over extractive industries is endemic, however shale gas
has particular features which heighten the issue's controversy. Natural
gas dispersed throughout low permeability rock formations, shale gas
was historically considered uneconomic to extract until horizontal
drilling and high-volume, slickwater fracturing (fracking) technologies
were developed in the United States during the 1990s. These technol-
ogies reversed the fortunes of US gas producers, turning them from an
industry in decline to the world's largest producer of natural gas in
under four years [21]. However, while the potential for improved en-
ergy security and increased tax revenue prompted other governments to
investigate their own domestic resources, the negative effects of shale
gas development, as publicised by Academy Award nominated doc-
umentary Gasland [2], led to increasing public concern. These effects
were worsened by the pace of the industry's meteoric rise, which left
regulators operating in an information deficit [22]; the high spatial
intensity of development [23]; and the technology's ability to access
previously undeveloped gas fields which brought rural communities
into sudden proximity with intensive industrial activity [24]. A raft of
research followed documenting the health, environmental and social
effects of the industry (e.g., [1,25,26]) and posing broader questions
about the climate change effects of a new source of fossil fuel [27].
The extent to which the US experience will be replicated elsewhere
remains uncertain since national differences in geology, regulation,
infrastructure, supply chain maturity, population density and hydro-
carbon ownership regimes all shape the industry's development.
Nonetheless, its first adopter status means the US provides the bench-
mark for perceptions of the industry globally [28] and remains the
source of most primary information about its effects. Public debate on
the issue is marked by a profound mistrust of official sources and a
deeply-felt belief that local interests are disregarded in favour of na-
tional economic gain [29–32]. Unsurprisingly, for an issue char-
acterised by scientific uncertainty and mistrust, contests over what
counts as legitimate knowledge have come to the fore [33] leading to
significant variances between national policy as policy-makers give
greater or lesser weight to different criteria [34]. Highlighting the sci-
entific uncertainty which permeates the issue has proved a successful
tactic of resistance for anti-shale gas campaigners across parts of Europe
and the US, as they invoke the precautionary principle to deadlock
development and use the internet to access alternative sources of in-
formation to those preferred by the political mainstream [35–37].
In England, where debates over contentious scientific issues have
long been marked by an institutional belief that public scepticism is a
matter of information deficit which can be addressed by the populace
becoming better informed [38], the official presumption in favour of
shale gas has been more difficult to disrupt. From 2012 to 2019, the
Government position remained that opposition was predominantly due
to information deficit [39] and that public disquiet would ease once
development was underway, a stance justified by reference to attitude
trackers showing almost half the public remained undecided on the
matter, primarily because they did not think they knew enough to judge
[40]. The belief that development was a necessary pre-requisite to ac-
ceptance was made explicit in a leaked 2016 cabinet letter:
One of the hurdles to overcome to develop a more favourable public
attitude is that nobody in the UK has seen or experienced a shale
fracking operation in their area […] We need some exploration
wells to clearly demonstrate that shale exploration can be done
cleanly and safely here.
(quoted in [41])
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By framing the issue as one where only UK-specific, expert-gener-
ated, technical information would be sufficient to ease the public mind,
it appears ministers hoped to distance themselves from the worst of the
US experience. However, this approach contained two implicit as-
sumptions. Firstly, that the exploration work needed to demonstrate
this position would go ahead. Secondly, that those opposed to the in-
dustry would accept government-generated information rather than
looking elsewhere to inform themselves. As our analysis will show,
neither of these assumptions proved correct, leading to a widening
online information divide.
2.3. Internet use in information-intensive conflicts
As internet use increases globally, the increased reach, speed and
low cost of digital technologies makes them a useful tool for activists,
lowering the barriers to mobilisation, participation and information
sharing [42–44]. Changes in the accessibility of information have po-
litical importance and the potential to force change upon incumbent
powers [45]. Their political effect however, is less clear and an ex-
tensive body of academic work considers whether online activism truly
empowers protest movements, offering new means of influence, or
serves to enforce existing patterns of inequality and power [44,46–49].
Between these two extremes, a third school of thought – the equalisa-
tion thesis – suggests the effects are more heterogeneous but primarily
serve to benefit outsider organisations rather than dominant institu-
tional actors, serving to level the political playing field [8].
Early work on the changing dynamics of protest in the internet age
argued the environmental movement was well placed to exploit the
richer information environment which the internet offered, due to its
cross-border links and intrinsic orientation towards information-based
campaigns [45,47]. More recent work is less optimistic, cautioning
against too instrumental a focus on how environmental activists use
information and for more consideration of the broader consequences of
this use [50] arguing modern environmental movements have to win on
and offline if they are to succeed [51]. As concerns about fake news,
misinformation and algorithmic bias proliferate [48,49,52] debates
about online information quality have come to the fore, leading to
emergent bodies of research on the rise of ‘post-truth’ politics [53] and
calls for further research on how protest movements navigate an online
information environment of growing complexity [7].
Contention over shale gas incorporates many broader concerns
about information quality and content, raising important questions
about the political role of online information and how it may operate to
perpetuate or curtail dissent. To date however, although the role of the
internet in mobilising opposition to shale gas has been noted [3,51,54],
research has primarily focused upon how stakeholders frame the issue
online [55–57] while recent studies using a post-political framework to
study contentious issues [18,58] have noted activists’ use of the internet
but have yet to subject this activity to post-political analysis. In this
paper, we address this dual gap, focusing our analysis upon the overall
effect, rather than specific content, of online information about shale
gas, to provide the first account of its role in contesting the issue.
3. Materials and methods
3.1. The Lancashire shale gas debate
Methodologically, we adopted a case study approach [59] using the
Fylde, Lancashire, as our subject. Home to the first and, to-date, only
active shale gas sites in the UK, the Fylde area has become the test case
for the social and technical feasibility of shale gas development. Work
initially began in spring 2011, when exploration company Cuadrilla
Resources carried out the UK's first shale gas frack at their Preese Hall
site. During this process, fracturing fluid was inadvertently injected into
a previously unidentified fault leading to a series of seismic events [60].
A 13-month moratorium followed and the industry has remained
controversial ever since. The moratorium was lifted in December 2012
and in the following year Cuadrilla applied to undertake exploration at
two further sites at Roseacre Wood and Preston New Road. Lancashire
anti-shale gas campaigners spent four years challenging these proposals
through the planning process but by the time of our fieldwork, Cua-
drilla had gained permission to drill at Preston New Road where site
set-up was underway. Direct action was ongoing outside the site
throughout our data collection period.
3.2. Interview data
Our corpus is made up of 37 semi-structured interviews conducted
between March 2017 and August 2018, contextualised by attendance at
industry conferences, public meetings and planning inquiries.
Interviewees were identified through internet searches, event atten-
dance and snowball sampling. Interviews took place either face to face
or by telephone/Skype and lasted between 30 minutes and two and a
quarter hours during which we asked participants about internet use
and shale gas, and their views on the effects of online activity. Data
collection continued until we had reached saturation. We focussed our
participant recruitment upon those who were active online in relation
to shale gas, however we were mindful also to include interviewees who
characterised themselves as casual internet users and/or as sceptical
about its value. Due to the contentious nature of the issue and small
number of individuals involved, we asked participants to choose their
pseudonyms to minimise the possibility of identification.
Interviewees were categorised by their stance towards shale gas, as
determined by their self-reported views, and their relationship to online
content (Table 1). Those pro-shale gas believed development should go
ahead; those anti- believed it should be halted; and those neutral,
characterised their role as providing or assessing information rather
than advocating one way or another. The ten pro-shale gas interviewees
were members of the industry; industry consultants; ran websites on
shale gas or were academics who had expressed support for the in-
dustry. Some interviewees took more than one of these roles. The
twenty anti-shale gas interviewees were members of the loose coalition
of Lancashire anti-shale gas groups; climate justice activists; worked for
environmental NGOs or ran websites on shale gas. Once again, some
interviewees took more than one role. The seven interviewees who
characterised themselves as neutral worked for regulatory agencies in
shale gas related roles; or undertook consultancy or academic outreach
work on shale gas. Interview requests were also made to the Whitehall
departments involved in the regulation of shale gas, to Lancashire
County Council planning department and to Lancashire pro-shale gas
groups, however these groups did not respond.
Interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed using Nvivo 11.
The transcriptions were coded using thematic analysis, working from
the specific to the general in a series of iterative steps [61] as we tested
and refined our ideas against the empirical evidence [62]. To assist in
analysis, we categorised participants additionally by their relationship
to online content as follows. Creators generated original content on
shale gas for online publication. Commissioners had professional re-
sponsibility for online content on shale gas but did not create it them-
selves. Curators ran social media accounts sharing information about
shale gas. Recipients had a professional role which meant they were on
Table 1
Interviewees by relationship to online content and stance towards shale gas.
Pro Neutral Anti Total
Content creators 1 1 4 6
Content commissioners 2 3 1 6
Content curators 1 0 7 8
Content recipients 4 2 2 8
Content consumers 2 1 6 9
Total 10 7 20
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the receiving end of online activity about shale gas. Consumers used
online information to research shale gas and to keep up to date with
developments. Where interviewees approached online content in more
than one way, we characterised them according to their primary re-
lationship. Analysing data through this dual lens allowed us to identify
the commonalities underpinning interviewees’ often polarised ac-
counts, giving rise to the categories discussed in Section 4.2.
4. Results and discussion
We present our results in three parts. In Section 4.1, we address our
first research question, showing how different stakeholder groups used
online information to engage in the shale gas debate. In doing so, we
reveal how the tortuous progress of shale gas development in England
led to a phenomenon which we term an ‘online information divide’
whereby the dominant institutional actors were heavily constrained in
their online activity, while anti-shale gas campaigners were not. In
Section 4.2, we address our second research question and identify how
the particular challenges of engaging online with an information-in-
tensive issue affected the different groups. In Section 4.3, we address
our third research question and consider the consequences of these
findings for political contestation of an information-intensive issue.
4.1. Evolution of an online information divide
4.1.1. Industry inaction: a vacuum in the communications space?
The seismic events caused by Cuadrilla's initial drilling in spring
2011 were the initiating event in the information divide, which was
only beginning to be closed by summer 2017, as development activity
gained pace. While these initial quakes were not high in magnitude,
they catapulted shale gas into the headlines, raising public awareness
about fracking. From the perspective of those in favour of the industry
the resulting debate was poorly informed, to the extent some that some
had felt compelled to take action.
This was back in two thousand and eleven-ish I guess, and the
quality of the public debate around shale gas was very poor. You'd
see reports in the news and online newspapers, and things that I
read, and kind of just pulling my hair up […] So I started the blog to
try and vent some frustration and correct some of what I saw.
Academic Geoscientist
Operators, however, were slow to respond. Our interviewees sug-
gested there were historical, institutional and cultural reasons for this
inaction. Historically, the UK oil and gas sector had operated un-
controversially onshore for decades at conventional hydrocarbon sites
such as Wytch Farm in Dorset. Many industry members, seeing little
practical difference between conventional and unconventional hydro-
carbon extraction techniques, expected similar public indifference to
shale gas, failing to apprehend they were operating in a very different
media environment from that which had applied during the develop-
ment of these fields, forty years previously.
The companies were coming out of that older perspective of how the
oil and gas industry had worked in the 20th century […] I don't
think they had really engaged with, or thought about, the online
discourse.
Academic Geologist
This failure to take account of the changed information environment
was in part due to the staff profile of shale gas companies which, with
the exception of multinational INEOS, were small entrepreneurial
businesses made up of a few dozen technical specialists who had limited
focus on public engagement. As one veteran industry member reflected,
“we'd rather not think about it, because it's much easier to design a
pipeline than to try and keep a village happy.” As a result, operators
reported being unprepared for the significantly more hostile operating
environment which greeted them once the moratorium lifted.
Within two years it was like we had never done this before, and it
was a whole new thing, and it was super-scary. It was amazing to see
how that awareness had gone absolutely to a negative side from our
point of view.
Oil and gas industry member
Four years of legal disputes followed, as local campaign groups
fought development through the planning system and courts. With
exploration work stalled, operators had little new information to share
and little spare capital to invest in publicity campaigns. Acutely aware
of the newly contentious nature of their work and disinclined to expose
themselves to further criticism, they believed the prudent response was
to retreat from the public debate until they had something concrete to
say.
There was no flow of information coming from industry because we
didn't want to say something that we might not end up doing and be
seen as being irresponsible or not sharing the facts.
Veteran industry member
In the interim, operators, UKOOG, the industry body, and their re-
spective consultants concentrated their online activity on websites,
where they could retain control of their message, and on shoring up
government support. Locally, operators focussed on face to face en-
gagement and public drop-in sessions. In retrospect, some wondered
how well this online reticence had served them.
There was a vacuum in the communications space and it was com-
pletely taken up and controlled by NGOs and anti-groups, and I
think the industry was not prepared for that and they just had no
response […] [there was] very little counter-narrative.
Oil and gas industry member
By summer 2017, drilling was underway and concrete information
on the progress of the industry became available. Operators experi-
enced a resurgence in confidence and UKOOG began a Facebook cam-
paign in recognition of the industry's need for a broader social media
presence. However, even those positive towards development ques-
tioned whether it was by now too late to make substantial inroads into
public opinion. As one industry supporter commented in 2018:
They have been very slow to get off the bat. They have spent, in-
dividually, a fortune all these different companies on PR instead of
clubbing together and putting out information […] they never
seemed to get their act together in that sense, and of course it grows
legs because of social media.
Local business owner
4.1.2. The regulatory conundrum: nothing's happened for six years
Given the lack of information flowing from industry prior to 2017,
the task of informing the public about shale gas predominantly fell to
government agencies. Here again, officials were constrained, both in
what they could share and the extent to which they felt able to promote
this content. The Environment Agency (EA), the English environmental
regulator, led on public engagement for government while supporting
web content, including fact sheets and blog content was produced by
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), the Oil and Gas
Authority (OGA), the Office of Unconventional Gas and Oil, the British
Geological Survey (BGS) and the Health and Safety Executive.
However, once general information on shale gas had been made
available, the lack of on-the-ground activity meant regulators had little
substantive new information to add. As one Environment Agency offi-
cial commented in spring 2017, “For shale gas, more so than for con-
ventional, there genuinely isn't anything happening […] Nothing's
happened for six years,” (Environment and Business Advisor B.)
This comment reveals the extent to which framing the issue as one
of technical information deficit circumscribed the official discourse.
Politically, a great deal had happened in the previous six years.
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Significant events included the Balcombe anti-shale gas protests of
2013; the Infrastructure Act 2015, which removed the right of land-
owners to veto drilling beneath their property; Lancashire County
Council refusing planning permission to Cuadrilla in 2015; the
Lancashire planning inquiries of 2016 and the Communities Secretary's
subsequent decision that exploration should go ahead at Preston New
Road. These events generated extensive media coverage but did not
provide the type of content which regulators could share.
The place-specific nature of geology, and ministers’ insistence that
the UK had a world-leading system of oil and gas regulation [63]
compounded this issue, since once the UK had been positioned as an
exceptional case, it was difficult to plug the information gap using case-
studies of good practice from abroad. The task was further complicated
by the complexity of the subject matter, which did not lend itself well to
engaging online content. Recognising this issue, BGS, the organisation
tasked with advancing geoscientific knowledge in the UK, took steps to
make their website content on shale gas more ‘iPad-friendly” (Senior
Scientist, BGS) but, as they acknowledged, their content was not in-
tended to address the broader policy question of whether shale gas
development should proceed. EA interviewees concurred and added
that shale gas's contentious nature limited the extent to which they
could promote their own online content while maintaining public trust
in their impartiality. In addition, the resource implications of producing
high quality content and engaging online were significant and had to be
balanced against core regulatory functions.
4.1.3. The anti-shale gas campaign: do you want to know more about
fracking?
Unlike the industry and government, who were constrained in their
internet activity, for those opposed to shale gas, going online was often
an important first step in becoming involved in the campaign. Most
local residents reported hearing about shale gas through pre-existing
community networks in the aftermath of the 2011 seismic events.
Almost invariably, having had their interest piqued, their next action
was to go online to find out more.
I saw a thing about, “do you want to know more about fracking?”
Yes, I did. So, I went along to a meeting and heard enough there that
I wanted to go away and draw my own conclusions. And that's ac-
tually what [the speaker] said […] having had your interest
prompted perhaps, go and do some research. So, I did, and in the
process, I set up the website […] to log some of the things that I had
found.
Anti-shale gas blogger
Information painting shale gas in a negative light was ubiquitous,
but information from the industry was not so easy to find. While op-
erators portrayed their reticence as sensible prudence in the face of
uncertainty, anti-shale gas campaigners were more likely to perceive it
as indicating they had something to hide.
I looked at the Cuadrilla website a long time ago, in the early days,
and I thought it was very slick. What was interesting about the
content of the website wasn't what they were telling you, it was
what they weren't telling you and how they framed the arguments. I
thought it was very interesting. They are very careful about the
information that's on there and they don't say too much, which is
also very acute because if you don't say anything, then you can't be
accused of anything.
Frack Free Lancashire campaigner A
Government websites were more informative but campaigners
tended to use these selectively. Supporting web content such as videos
and information sheets, which government officials were more likely to
refer to when discussing their online engagement strategies, were
mostly disregarded or bypassed.
We use the reports and things that are on there. I wouldn't say we
always go directly to the website. It's often that one person has
found the report, and then sends it by email to their network.
Renewable Energy Activist
Interviews with campaigners confirmed the extent to which in-
formation-sharing was a major motivating factor in their online ac-
tivity. Just as some industry supporters reported feeling obliged to
provide information about shale gas, so many who opposed it also
perceived a moral obligation to share what they knew. The target of this
activity was variously described to us as the ‘missing middle’ ‘the ‘un-
decided’ or the ‘fifty percent’, in reference to government polls which
consistently showed half of the public to be undecided about shale gas
[40]. Few local campaigners had any interest in trying to engage with
politicians directly, believing government support of shale gas was
entrenched. Having themselves gone online to find out about shale gas,
their hope was that their neighbours too would read, and having
learned more, be persuaded to act.
In contrast to the dominant institutional players, while local cam-
paign groups had websites, most interviewees considered them tan-
gential to their efforts, particularly given the absence of funds to pay for
eye-catching design and search engine optimisation. Campaigners on
the whole did not consider themselves expert internet users – rather the
contrary. Social media, in particular Facebook, which was free to access
and familiar to many already, became the movement's platform of
choice. While dictated more by pragmatic considerations than any
strategic imperative, one effect was to move the local debate about
shale gas onto a platform where the speed and informality of interac-
tion made it difficult for industry and government to engage, as one
commentator reflected:
I think one of the contrasts between government and industry and the rest
is that they're just slow, cumbersome. […] UKOOG did this with ques-
tions about shale – I don't think they really understand how people use
the online and how people use social media. And it always comes across
as your parents trying to dress like you. It's a bit clumsy and not quite
there.
Reporter on Oil and Gas
Compared to government and industry therefore, anti-shale gas
campaigners were less constrained in their choice of online platform,
could draw from a wider variety of sources domestically and abroad,
and could share a wider variety of content. This relative freedom,
however, did not mean engaging online with an information-intensive
issue was straightforward, as the next section will detail.
4.2. Challenges of navigating the information age
4.2.1. Complexity
There was a common understanding amongst our interviewees that
shale gas was a notably complex topic. This complexity arose from two
main sources: (1) the technical and operational uncertainties associated
with extraction and regulation, in many cases unanswerable unless or
until the industry began commercial operation; and (2) the range of
potential effects: on local environment, health and amenity, on climate
change and on local democracy. For the academics, public officials and
industry consultants tasked with public engagement, the effect was to
increase the number of tangible threats or ‘mobilisation targets’ [64]
around which public concern condensed.
Complexity was an issue for all those tasked with creating and
commissioning online content on shale gas: “What we actually realised
after a while was that some of the research papers you could not sim-
plify to a point that was understandable by everybody,” (Academic
Geoscientist). It made engaging on social media particularly taxing
since the rapid-fire nature of the medium and low character limits left
little room for nuance, with exchanges often dissolving into acrimony.
Anti-shale gas campaigners, by contrast, had less need to engage with
the technical and operational uncertainties of extraction, since they
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were not required to justify why the industry should proceed. They
dealt with the range of potential effects by dividing issue areas amongst
themselves and focussing their research upon the aspects of shale gas
which experience and education best equipped them to address. Even so
apportioned, their task was not straightforward. The available material
was highly technical, sometimes conflicting and on occasions in-
complete. Facing a polarised and sceptical public, interviewees from
across the board expressed a strong preference for face to face com-
munication when discussing the issues. However, public meetings could
become heated, putting off more moderate groups from attending, and
in any case were only accessible to those with the time, motivation and
means to take part.
Despite these challenges, local campaigners believed that engaging
with this complexity was a necessary evil in order to be recognised as
legitimate participants rather than NIMBYs or scaremongers. The
burden of participation was exacerbated by a complex regulatory
system, involving multiple government agencies and policies. Being
able to go online and find out this information for themselves was a
necessary first step in being able to participate, but the complexity of
the subject matter made it a time-consuming, frustrating and often
thankless task.
You're not just fighting with getting to know well integrity, and
what shale gas fracking is, and the volumes, and health and safety,
you're trying to fight with all the government and the bureaucracy
and the administration.
Resident, Lytham
4.2.2. Loss of gatekeepers
This complexity was compounded by the variety of sources avail-
able online, leaving anti-shale gas campaigners with little need to ac-
cess company and government websites other than for the purpose of
engaging in the planning process, or to monitor the general tenor of
official communications. For those undertaking public engagement, the
effect was twofold. On the one hand, the prevalence of negative online
information about shale gas, combined with a lack of quality control led
to polarised views about the industry which were difficult to address.
However, as a general principle those running public consultations also
expressed the belief that the public was informed about shale gas to an
extent which would not have been possible without access to online
information. Their concern was how lay people might best navigate the
increased variety of sources in the absence of gatekeepers. This stance
differs somewhat to that revealed by previous research where officials
have characterised public resistance to shale gas as a matter of in-
formation deficit [39]. Here, it was framed instead as a matter of in-
formation literacy:
It is good to have diversity of information but you need to have
authority. Otherwise, how are people going to make any decision?
How are they going to become informed? They can't.
Senior Scientist, BGS
Amongst the anti-shale gas campaign, NGOs also perceived their
role shifting from a more hierarchical model of information dis-
semination to a less formal, networked approach, reflecting previous
work on the effect of digital technologies on social movement organi-
sation [43].
We are not the information provider that perhaps we were on some
campaigns. […] people are finding out the information for them-
selves and we are working out what our role is in this new, relatively
new, online campaigning world.
National Campaigner, Friends of the Earth
This dual loss of gatekeepers presented challenges for the anti-shale
gas campaign. The ability to access alternative sources of information
empowered members to build their own community of experts, how-
ever this more equal access came at a cost. This was partly logistical:
with no intermediary layer to filter information the burden of under-
taking quality control fell onto individuals, increasing the chances of
overload and the risk of spreading misinformation. Other effects were
more emotionally draining: having access to information about the
dangers of shale gas but without any apparent means to halt the in-
dustry's progress added to the stress and anxiety already prevalent in
communities facing shale gas development [30]. The failure of gov-
ernment to acknowledge it was now only one online voice amongst
many, and adjust its approach accordingly, contributed to local alie-
nation and re-enforced the narratives of bad governance which un-
derpinned local opposition [32].
4.2.3. Abundance
Complexity and a lack of gatekeepers led to information abundance
as online content about shale gas proliferated, affecting different sta-
keholder groups in different ways. Government officials had little need
to go online to seek information, believing they were kept sufficiently
informed by merit of their position. From their perspective, information
abundance predominantly manifest via mass responses to online con-
sultations which regularly numbered in the tens of thousands. While
campaign members believed these activities had a broader role to play
in registering strength of opposition, those involved in the consenting
process downplayed their importance. Responses were often template
letters with limited relevance to decision-making and their sheer
quantity led to so-called ‘cheap-talk’ effects, whereby the volume of
response weakened the overall message [45]. In the early stages of
development, the unprecedented volume of online response placed
regulators under significant strain, but by the time of our data collec-
tion it was perceived as the new norm. As one Environment Agency
official commented: “It did attract a lot of attention certainly internally
to the project. But I think it's – I think it's starting to be a lot more
normal now […] I don't know if it would necessarily do that in future,”
(Environment and Business Advisor A).
Industry members, likewise, reported little need to seek information
online. From their perspective, the effects of information abundance
were twofold. First, the sheer volume of online information made it
possible to find content which supported almost any view of shale gas.
“They'll say, ‘Google fracking’ but if you Google ‘toothpaste’ you can
find enough reasons it will kill you,” (Production Manager, oil and gas
industry). This issue was compounded by the negative connotations of
the term ‘fracking’ [65]. A second, linked effect was the increased
regulatory scrutiny which the subsequent public concern engendered.
This added to their costs, and once underway tended to perpetuate it-
self, leading to further delay.
Everything is as it should be but it creates a massive amount of noise
and nuisance and you then open yourself up to the next level of
argument which says, “Well, there have been all these objections,
and there's no smoke without fire.”
Veteran industry member
By contrast, anti-shale gas campaigners were directly affected by
online information abundance and the aligned expectation that they
would remain abreast of developments. Information came from four
main sources. Firstly, official planning documents. Without these re-
sidents would have been unable to engage in formal consultations
however, the volumes of information involved were significant and
online access led to unrealistic expectations of local groups.
There's no way normal residents can wade through four and a half
thousand pages of documentation, understand it and come up with
comments on it, and respond in four weeks.
Member of local residents’ group
Secondly, the campaign generated significant volumes of in-group
electronic chatter which members, particularly those responsible for
curating information, needed to monitor. Thirdly, there was a constant
supply of newly published academic and grey literature to digest and
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share. Finally, there were postings from pro-fracking groups to con-
sider. The volume of data placed a significant burden on participants,
and their personal relationships, and a number expressed the opinion
that information acquisition was a process subject to diminishing re-
turns.
Compounding this issue was the problem of misinformation which
added to the volume of information and increased the effort required to
manage it. Poor information quality has long been a defining feature of
internet content [52] and campaign members were acutely aware of
contemporary debates about fake news, realising that distributing in-
correct content had the potential to delegitimise their claims. The re-
quirement to undertake quality control on the information they were
sharing – to act as digitally literate citizens – increased the burden of
participation, and the networked leaderless nature of the protest meant
they had no way to reign in those who were less circumspect. Many
industry supporters believed the anti-shale gas campaign knowingly
spread incorrect information in order to increase fear and distrust.
Those who were neutral about the industry reserved judgement, ob-
serving that making unsupported claims was not the sole preserve of
either side. Whatever the motivation behind its spread, however, all
parties agreed that the proliferation of online misinformation about
shale gas was almost impossible to address.
4.3. ‘Google Fracking’ online information and the post-politics of shale gas
Online information may have the potential to level the political
playing field but the dynamics in our case appear more complex.
Government strategy on shale gas sought to frame public concerns as
predominantly due to unfamiliarity with the technology, rather any
more fundamental doubts about the distributive injustice of develop-
ment or the desirability of a future societal trajectory based upon fossil
fuels. Arguably, similar dynamics are apparent in accounts from in-
dustry supporters which positioned opposition to shale gas as a result of
the industry's initial failure to get to grips with online engagement ra-
ther than any broader concerns about the industry itself. But no matter
how they were framed, the combined effect of this technical focus and
organisational inaction, was to constrain how effectively the dominant
institutional actors could engage online. However, more favourable
online conditions did not deliver immediate offline dominance to the
anti-shale gas movement. Rather, it appeared as though the post-poli-
tical consensus in favour of development had prevailed when Cuadrilla
began fracking at Preston New Road in October 2018, shortly after our
data collection concluded.
Post-political theory provides us with two means with which to
interrogate these dynamics. The first is to focus our attention upon the
insuppressible nature of dissent [5,11,12]. Accepting that contention
can never be entirely excluded from politics leads us to examine the
multiple and sometimes unexpected ways in which it may reappear.
From the operators’ perspective, the most obvious consequence of the
heightened public awareness engendered by online activity was an in-
crease in regulatory oversight incommensurate with the risk they be-
lieved their activities entailed. The increased scrutiny led to increased
costs, deadlocking development and causing some to wonder if the
industry would ever take off.
You know that everything is going to be scrutinised to the nth de-
gree. Unfortunately, what it means is you put a rocket or airline
investment into what is probably a family Escort. […] And at some
point you think to yourself, “the project won't support this, I can't do
it.”
Veteran industry member
In the interim, operators retreated from the online and focussed
their effort on shoring up support from potential supporters. For gov-
ernment, the consequence was six years of delay as the planning process
ground to a halt. Unable to demonstrate shale gas's safety until devel-
opment was underway, ministers began a consultation on a raft of
planning reforms including making development a Nationally
Significant Infrastructure Project [66], and therefore subject to less
extensive public consultation than the existing regime. Such responses
reflect findings from previous work on the post-politics of planning [17]
which reveal an institutional retreat to more easily controlled arenas
when public contention cannot be contained.
Campaign members had a more ambivalent relationship with online
information. On the one hand, going online to become informed had
been a necessary prerequisite to being recognised as legitimate parti-
cipants. On the other, it contributed to feelings of disempowerment by
revealing the extent to which decision-making framework excluded
some voices and privileged others. Having access to a range and depth
of information previously only available to policy elites raised ex-
pectations that those in power would be responsive to their concerns
but delivered little in the way of substantive influence, leading even-
tually to disenchantment. The unwillingness of the dominant institu-
tional actors to engage online heightened perceptions of a lack of
transparency and democratic deficit.
Perceptions of bad governance and procedural injustice have been a
potent force in motivating opposition to shale gas in Lancashire since
the outset [29–32]. The official retreat from online interaction added
another layer to these dynamics, appearing to substantiate the belief
that there was little local people could do to influence policy. Having
failed to halt development through officially sanctioned routes, many of
our interviewees concluded that direct action was, if not something
they personally wanted to engage in, nonetheless the only remaining
option to express their opposition.
The industry with its lobbyists can cruise the corridors of power,
have meetings that we know nothing about, have their voices heard
right at the heart of government. The only place that people who
oppose it can have their voices heard is out on the streets.
Campaigner, St Anne's
The most immediate effect of the online information divide there-
fore was not to give greater political prominence to dissenting voices
but rather to expose the extent to which they were excluded from of-
ficial arenas. The result was to galvanise the turn to direct action, with
protesters at Preston New Road demonstrating under the banner ‘you
left us no choice.’ As Žižek argues, the “suffocating closure” ([12] p.
204) of the politics of consensus does not foreclose dissent, rather by
precluding the expression of dissenting voices it generates the impetus
towards further antagonism.
The second insight offered by post-political theory is its ability to
alert us to the deeply political ways in which governance arrangements
may operate to exclude dissenting opinions, and the consequences of
structuring decision-making in this way. In this instance, the official
position that resistance to development was predominantly a matter of
information deficit proved fundamentally flawed. Once Cuadrilla re-
sumed fracking in October 2018, the seismic events returned at in-
creasing intensity. Rather than demonstrating the process was safe,
first-hand experience of shale gas exploration re-enforced public con-
cerns that the process was dangerous. Opinion polls showed opposition
increasing amidst particular concerns about earthquakes [40]. Direct
action continued throughout 2019, but it took a combination of fi-
nancial unprofitability, political expediency, and technical infeasibility
to disrupt the presumption in favour of development. Within a period of
ten days, a National Audit Office report on the high costs and limited
progress of the shale gas industry [67] was followed by the an-
nouncement of a snap General Election to break the Brexit deadlock and
an OGA report concluding it was not possible to accurately predict the
magnitude and likelihood of future tremors at Preston New Road [68].
In response, the Government announced a moratorium on hydraulic
fracturing in November 2019, “until compelling new evidence is pro-
vided,” [9] and shelved the proposed planning reforms.
Does this signal the death knell of shale gas in the UK? A post-po-
litical reading urges caution. Development has not been suspended
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because the Government accepts contined fossil fuel development is
incompatable with desired future societal trajectories. While the UK
Parliament has declared a climate emergency and passed legislation to
achieve net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, the Executive's
approach to shale gas remains fundamentally unchanged. The matter
continues to be adjudicated upon within narrow technical frameworks
of expert knowledge and risk calculation, specifically related to the
seismic events. Ministerial statements on the moratorium reiterate shale
gas's potential to provide a bridge to a low carbon future [9], a motif
which dates back to the first moratorium [31] and which is typically
post-political in its use of discourses of sustainability to cloak the sub-
stance of a policy focussed upon economic growth [4]. In response,
Cuadrilla have undertaken “to work constructively with the OGA to
provide further detailed data […] to address concerns so that the
moratorium can be lifted,” [69]. Ongoing public opposition, as ex-
pressed on and offline, has played an important role in delaying de-
velopment and making shale gas politically unacceptable in the run up
to a General Election. The ongoing uncertainty will doubtless unnerve
potential investors. The underpinning ideologies which provided the
impetus towards development however, appear unaltered, and while
they remain, the industry's fate hangs in the balance.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides the first assessment of online information use in
the English anti-shale gas campaign. It addresses a to-date under-re-
searched aspect of the issue, but contains a number of acknowledged
limitations. Firstly, the highly charged nature of the topic meant several
key individuals were unwilling to be interviewed, or would only speak
off-the-record. This was a particular issue for Lancashire residents in
favour of shale gas. Secondly, while interviewees’ accounts covered
2011-18, data collection took place towards the end of period and their
recollections may be incomplete. A study of website and social media
content relating to shale gas over the same time-frame would help
elaborate upon and substantiate our account of an online information
divide. Thirdly, shale gas is a fast-moving topic; the political context
changed over the course of our research and continued to do so during
write up. Our paper is accurate as of November 2019 and the passing of
the second moratorium but, as we have argued, the long term outlook
for shale gas in England remains unclear and the influence of online
information use on the debate cannot yet be definitively stated.
As with all issues within the energy-environment nexus, shale gas is
a complex topic and online information only compounds this com-
plexity. Contestation over which knowledges count as legitimate and
who has the right to interpret them have a long history in disputes over
contentious issues [33] but with the increasing ubiquity of online in-
formation, the dominant institutional belief that a better informed ci-
tizenry will necessarily become a more acquiescent one appears in-
creasingly untenable. Nascent industries in particular are likely to find
themselves in the position of English shale gas operators, unable to
engage effectively in an online environment where they hold no pri-
vileged position and their voice is only one amongst many. Govern-
ments may find that their attempts to depoliticise an issue have unin-
tended consequences [70] and that conventional tactics aimed at
reducing conflict no longer work as they did in the pre-internet era.
Conversely, the ubiquity of online information cannot be assumed to
operate straightforwardly to the benefit of citizens attempting to in-
fluence public policy. While it may enhance their status as legitimate
participants it may also increase their challenges, as they seek to na-
vigate an increasingly complex information ecology. New areas of
contestation are likely to emerge as knowledge disputes expand to in-
corporate claims and counter-claims about information literacy. Post-
political theory alerts us to the nuances of these arguments and how
they too may be operationalised to bypass dissent.
Social conflict is a characteristic of all energy projects [71]. As in-
ternet use increases globally, and particularly in the Global South,
research on contentious technology and resource development will
benefit from considering the political effects of this changing informa-
tion environment. Useful avenues for further research include com-
parative work across jurisdictions to assess how specific features of the
resource, in combination with local histories, technologies, political
and cultural contexts influence how changes in information access
shapes the development of these conflicts. The post-political thesis ar-
gues that dissensus can never be permanently excluded from politics
but as this article shows, neither does internet activism provide a
straightforward channel for its return. Online activity did not level the
political playing field for the anti-shale gas campaign, although it may
have highlighted to campaigners the extent to which it was uneven and
galvanised a turn to direct action. Understanding the varied ways in
which internet use influences the expression of dissent will become an
increasingly important aspect of the study of contentious energy issues
in the twenty-first century.
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